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The "Existing Indian Family" Exception to the Indian
Child Welfare Act: The States' Attempt to Slaughter
Tribal Interests in Indian Children
Cheyahina L. Jaffke*
INTRODUCTION
Pretend for a moment that War of the Worlds' is not science
fiction, but rather reality. Instead of the Martians dying, they
actually live and govern humans. At first, the policy of the
Martian government toward humans is assimilation. They want all
humans to think and act like Martians. Therefore, they passed
rules and regulations to further that policy. The policy of
assimilation targets the youngest and most vulnerable humans, our
children. This policy resulted in human children being taken from
their human parents' homes and raised by Martian families.
Human children began to lose their identity as humans but could
not take on the identity of Martians, because they did not look like
Martians. So the human children tended to lack an identity, which
resulted in cultural confusion, rejection by Martian society, and
drug and alcohol abuse.
After several decades of this policy, the Martians enact a new
policy that favors humans raising human children. However, some
of the courts on Mars, refused to apply this policy to human
children if the children or the parents are not "human enough."
Despite the Martian government's desire to rectify past policies of
assimilation with the new law, some of the Martian judicial
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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officers believe they know what is best and ignore the interests of
the children, the parents, and the human race.
Fortunately for us, Martians are science fiction. However the
previous scenario imitates what has happened to American Indian
tribes and American Indian children over the years. The federal
government had a policy of assimilation that resulted in Indian
children being removed from their Indian homes and placed in
non-Indian homes or boarding schools. The federal government
tried to rectify this past policy of assimilation with the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act). The ICWA provided special rules
for the removal or the adoption of Indian children. The ICWA
gave tribes interests and rights regarding Indian children. In doing
so, the federal government recognized that the tribes have the most
2to lose. The ICWA assumed that state courts would observe the
federal mandate and apply the statute uniformly.
3
Unfortunately, some state courts have created a judicial
exception to the ICWA, known as the "existing Indian family"
exception. These courts use this exception to avoid applying the
ICWA to the detriment of the tribes and the Indian children.
Despite the Act's clear definitions and determination of when it
applies, the exception was fashioned to ignore the plain language
and policies of the Act. This exception, in violation of the Act,
places the determination of whether a child is an Indian and subject
to the Act in the hands of state court judges, who are least likely to
be able to answer the question.
The first section of this article discusses the enactment of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, including the history that led up to the
Act and the congressional policy behind it. The second section of
this article discusses the relevant portions of the ICWA. The third
section of this article introduces and defines the "existing Indian
family" exception. The fourth section argues that the "existing
Indian family" exception is wrong for five reasons. First, it
ignores tribal interests. Second, it violates the plain language of
2. Wendy Therese Parnell, Comment, The Existing Indian Family
Exception: Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 34
San Diego L. Rev. 381, 383 (1997).
3. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal
Forum to Vindicate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the
Vagaries of State Courts, 73 N.D. L. Rev. 395, 396 (1997).
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the ICWA. Third, it perpetuates an Anglo stereotype of American
Indians. Fourth, the ICWA does not need the exception to be
constitutional. Finally, the exception violates the principle of
uniformity that Congress was trying to achieve. The final section
presents what California has done, or attempted to do, in response
to the exception and will then argue that it is a model for the
nation.
I. ENACTMENT OF THE ICWA
A. Historical Background
The "wholesale separation of Indian children from their
families" was widely viewed as the "most tragic and destructive
aspect of American Indian life."4  The separation started with
white-run boarding schools dating back to the 1800s, when
American Indian children were removed from their homes in an
attempt to assimilate them into white culture. 5 It continued in the
1960s and 1970s, when state welfare workers and other officials
worked hard to find non-American Indian homes for American
Indian children, because of a lack of cultural sensitivity, and
paternalistic and assimilationist motives.
6
The state officials used high rates of alcoholism and poverty, as
well as poor housing, lack of modem plumbing, and
overcrowding 7 as justifications for removing these American
Indian children from their homes.8 When judging the fitness of an
American Indian parent, many social workers made decisions
based on white middle class norms that were not appropriate in the
4. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7531.
5. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 Emory L.J. 587,
602 (2002).
6. Id. at 603.
7. Michelle L. Lehmann, Comment, The Indian Child and Welfare Act of
1978: Does It Apply to the Adoption of an Illegitimate Indian Child, 38 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 511, 516-17 (1989).
8. Atwood, supra note 5, at 604.
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context of an American Indian family. 9 Social workers cited low-
income, joblessness, poor health, and low educational attainment
as reasons to remove an American Indian child from his or her
American Indian home.' 0 These factors resulted in the social
worker finding neglect or abandonment where none actually
existed." By 1978, over ninety percent of adopted American
Indian children had been placed in non-American Indian homes.
12
Surveys in 1969 and 1974 conducted by the Association of
American Indian Affairs (AAIA) found that approximately twenty-
five to thirty-five percent of all American Indian children were
separated from their families and placed in non-American Indian
foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.
1 3
B. Congressional Intent
These issues led Congress to enact the Indian Child Welfare
Act. Congress was concerned with not only American Indian
families, but also the American Indian community.' 4 The ICWA
was established to aid tribes in keeping American Indian children
in their American Indian community.'
5
Congress made an explicit policy statement in the ICWA that it
was to "protect the best interests of Indian children . . .by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture."' 6 This policy statement requires states to
9. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7532.
10. Id. at 7534.
11. Id. at 7532.
12. Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, Note, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of
Discretion: Eliminating the "Good Cause" Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act
Adoptive Placements, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1167, 1167-68 (1995).
13. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7531.
14. Parnell, supra note 2, at 419.
15. Id.
16. Denise L. Stiffarm, Note & Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act:
Guiding the Determination of Good Cause to Depart From the Statutory
736 [Vol. 66
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consider American Indian culture when determining what is in the
best interest of an American Indian child.1
7
1. Congressional Findings
When it enacted the ICWA, Congress made specific findings
within the Act itself. First, Congress recognized that there is a
"special relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes and their members."' 8  That relationship is a trustee
relationship in which Congress has a direct interest "in protecting
Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe."'
19
Second, Congress also recognized a "Federal responsibility to
Indian people., 20  That responsibility arises from Congress'
general course of dealing with American Indian tribes, statutes,
and treaties. This responsibility includes "the protection and
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources." 22 The resources
at issue in the ICWA are American Indian children, because this
resource is "vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian
tribes." 2
3
Third, Congress stated that its power to enact the ICWA came
from its plenary power over Indian affairs through clause 3, section
8, article I of the United States Constitution and other
constitutional authority. 24 It enacted the ICWA in response to an
alarmingly high percentage of American Indian families destroyed
by the unwarranted removal of their children by non-tribal public
and private agencies which placed these children with non-
American Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions. 25 In
Placement Preferences, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1151, 1162-63 (1995) (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 1902).
17. Id.
18. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2005).
19. Id. § 1901(3).
20. Id. § 1901.
21. Id. § 1901(2).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1901(3).
24. Id. § 1901(1).
25. Id. § 1901(4).
2006] 737
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enacting the ICWA, Congress acknowledged that the states had
"often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families."
26
2. Congressional Declaration of Policy
Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States to:
[P]rotect the best interests of [American] Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of [American]
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of [American] Indian
children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of [American] Indian culture, and by
providing for assistance to [American] Indian tribes in the
operation of child and family service programs. 27
II. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
A. Definitions
The ICWA takes great care to lay out key definitions of its vital
terms.
1. Who is an Indian ?28
The ICWA defines an "Indian" to mean "any person who is a
member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a
member of a Regional Corporation as defined in section 1606 of
title 43 .29
26. Id. § 1901(5).
27. Id. § 1902.
28. It is the author's preference to use the term American Indian. However,
the statute refers only to Indian, but it is understood to mean American Indian.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3).
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2. Who is an Indian Child?
The ICWA only applies to Indian children. The act is very
specific as to what is required to be an Indian child. The ICWA
defines an "Indian child" as "any unmarried person who is under
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe."
30
3. What is an Indian Tribe?
Because an Indian child must be a member of an Indian tribe,
or eligible for membership, the ICWA also defines this term. An
"Indian tribe" is "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized
group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the
services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their
status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in
section 1602(c) of title 43. '31
B. When Does the Act Apply?
The ICWA applies to all child custody proceedings that
involve an Indian child.32 A "child custody proceeding" is defined
to include foster care placements, terminations of parental rights,
pre-adoptive placements, and adoptive placements. 3 ' The ICWA
specifically excludes juvenile delinquency proceedings and child
custody proceedings occurring during a divorce proceeding. 34 To
trigger the Act, two things are required: first, a child custody
proceeding as defined by the ICWA, and second, an Indian child as
defined by the ICWA must be the subject of the child custody
proceeding. Once the ICWA is triggered, then the issue becomes
who has jurisdiction over the child.
30. Id. § 1903(4).
31. Id. § 1903(8).
32. Id. § 1903(1).
33. Id.
34. Id.
2006] 739
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C. Who Has Jurisdiction?
An Indian tribe will have exclusive jurisdiction over any child
custody proceeding:
involving an [American] Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except
where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by
an existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of
a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of
the child.35
Tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over child custody
matters regarding American Indian children who are not domiciled
on the reservation.
36
In any state court child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the state court:
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer
such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent
objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent
or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided,
That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the
tribal court of such tribe .... In any State court proceeding
for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child
and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at
any point in the proceeding.
37
Despite a clear grant of jurisdiction or the right to intervene,
"many state courts have created [an exception] to the application of
ICWA and have interpreted the statute in such a manner as to
render many of its provisions superfluous." 38 That exception is the
"existing Indian family" exception.
35. Id. § 1911(a).
36. Parnell, supra note 2, at 414.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)-(c).
38. Jones, supra note 3, at 395.
740 [Vol. 66
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
III. "EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY" EXCEPTION
A. Introduction
The "existing Indian family" exception, the most brazen
flouting of the ICWA,39 is viewed by many as the latest attempt to
force American Indians into modem society.40 By applying the
"existing Indian family" exception, state courts unilaterally decide
who is a real American Indian child despite a clear definition of
"Indian child" in the ICWA.4 1 By applying the "existing Indian
family" exception the states are using a back-door approach to do
exactly what the ICWA was intended to prevent: imposition of
white middle class standards to child custody cases involving
American Indian children.42
B. Definition
State courts have resisted the participation of tribes in
American Indian child custody proceedings and the application of
the ICWA by using the "existing Indian family" exception.43 The
"existing Indian family" exception is an entirely judge-made
doctrine that bars application of the ICWA when either the child or
the child's parents have not maintained a significant social,
39. Christine Metteer, Pigs in Heaven: A Parable of Native American
Adoption Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 610 (1996).
40. Samuel Prim, Student Article, The Indian Child Welfare Act & the
Existing Indian Family Exception: Rerouting the Trail of Tears?, 24 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 115, 115 (2000).
41. Jones, supra note 3, at 397.
42. Amanda B. Westphal, Student Article, An Argument In Favor of
Abrogating the Use of the Best Interests of the Child Standard to Circumvent the
Jurisdictional Provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act in South Dakota, 49
S.D. L. Rev. 107, 124 (2003).
43. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d
168 (Kan. 1982); In re D.S., 577 N.E. 2d 572 (Ind. 1991); Rye v. Weasel, 934
S.W. 2d 257 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v. J.A.L., 27,869 (La. App. 2 Cir. 07/06/95),
658 So. 2d 331; In re S.A.M., 703 S.W. 2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re T.S.,
801 P.2d 77 (Mont. 1990); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1259 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992);
Matter of Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985); In re Crews, 825
P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So.2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In
the Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W. 2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Matter of
Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988). See Westphal, supra note 42,
at 122-23.
2006]
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cultural, or political relationship with his tribe.44 This reluctance to
apply the ICWA has been extended by some courts to the point
where the Act only applies in cases where an American Indian
family has maintained significant political and cultural ties with
their tribe.45 In these jurisdictions, in order for the Act to apply,
the exception requires that the child be removed from an "existing
,46Indian family unit" or "Indian home or culture." State courts use
the exception to retain jurisdiction, to place American Indian
children in contravention of the placement preferences or to refuse
to allow American Indian parents to revoke consent to voluntary
foster care or adoption placements. 47
However, what qualifies as an "Indian family" has differed
from court to court. In situations where the American Indian child
never lived in an American Indian family and had no association
with American Indian culture, the ICWA may not be applied even
though the biological parent had such associations. 48
IV. APPLICATION OF THE "EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY" EXCEPTION-
CALIFORNIA AS A MODEL4 9
California has nineteen cases in which it applied the "existing
Indian family" exception. It was first applied in California by
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1 in In re Wanomi P.-
in 1989. In each case, the effect of applying the "existing Indian
family" exception was to deny a tribe jurisdiction or the right to
intervene. However, no case involving the "existing Indian
family" exception has reached the California Supreme Court.
44. Atwood, supra note 5, at 625.
45. Jones, supra note 3, at 402.
46. Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. Rev. 465, 476 (1993).
47. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision
of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 419, 428 (1998).
48. Jennifer L. Walters, Comment, In Re Elliott: Michigan's Interpretation
and Rejection of the Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 14 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 633, 639 (1997).
49. Other jurisdictions which have applied the "existing Indian family"
exception to avoid application of the ICWA are: Kansas, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, and Alabama. See cases
cited supra note 43.
50. 264 Cal. Rptr. 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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A. Who Has Applied It?
The California courts which applied the "existing Indian
family" exception have done so for two general reasons. First,
some courts believe that applying the exception protects the
constitutionality of the ICWA. 1 Second, other courts believe that
the exception is necessary to preserve the intended purpose of theICWA. 5 2T
1. Constitutional Arguments
Some courts in California have forgotten the lessons learned in
first-year Constitutional Law. They argue that the ICWA is a race-
based statute, despite the fact that its application is dependent upon
tribal membership or eligibility for membership. As a race-based
statute, these courts apply equal protection tests to the ICWA.
They find that, to the extent that disparate treatment is based upon
social, cultural, or political relationships between American Indian
children and their tribes, it does not violate the equal protection
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
53
However, when such social, cultural, or political relationships do
not exist or are very attenuated, they find the only remaining basis
for applying the ICWA is the child's race.
54
One court explained that recognition of the "existing Indian
family" doctrine was necessary in order to preserve the ICWA's
constitutionality. 55  It held that under the Fifth, Tenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, the ICWA does not and cannot apply to
invalidate a voluntary termination of parental rights respecting an
American Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation,
unless the child's biological parent, or parents, are not only of
51. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
52. See In re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1996);
Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (Cal.App. 6 Dist. Nov 26,
1997)
53. U.S. v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646, 97 S. Ct. 1395, 1398-99 (1977);
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-81, 96 S. Ct. 1634, 1644-
45 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2484 (1974),
cited in In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
54. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
55. Id. at 516.
20061 743
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American Indian descent, but also maintain a significant social,
cultural, or political relationship with their tribe.
56
2. ICWA Purpose
Another reason cited by the California courts for applying the
"existing Indian family" exception is that they believe the purpose
of the ICWA is to maintain American Indian culture. If there is no
culture to maintain, then there is no need to apply the ICWA.57
One court noted, "It is almost too obvious to require articulation
that 'the unique values of Indian culture' 58 will not be preserved in
the homes of parents who have become fully assimilated into non-
Indian culture."59 The determination of who is fully assimilated
into non-Indian culture is then left to the court itself.
60
Some courts have refused to apply the ICWA unless an
American Indian child is being removed from an "existing Indian
family," which means a family with a significant connection to the
Indian community. 61 The courts misinterpret the purpose of the
ICWA by limiting it to protect American Indian children from
improper removal from their "existing Indian family" units62 and
to promote the stability and security of American Indian tribes.63
B. Who Refused to Apply It?
Several courts in California have refused to apply the "existing
Indian family" exception. Some refused to do so because they
56. Id.
57. Hampton v. J.A.L., 27,869 (La. App. 2d Cir. 07/06/95), 658 So.2d 331,
334; Matter of Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992), cited in
Crystal R., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2005).
59. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
60. Id.
61. In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th 79, 83 (1998).
62. In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1491 (1996).
63. In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992); Matter of
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) cited in In re Bridget R., 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520.
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believe it is an unwarranted judicial gloss on the ICWA.64 Others
declined to rely on a judicially created exception to the ICWA that
appears nowhere in the Act itself.65 These courts recognize that
there is no threshold requirement in the Act that the child must
have been born into or be living with an existing Indian family, or
must have some particular type of relationship with the tribe or her
Indian heritage.
6
These courts rely on the express language of the ICWA and
know that "[n]o amount of probing into what Congress 'intended'
can alter what Congress said, in plain English ... ,,67 They argue
that the "existing Indian family" exception frustrates the policies
underlying the ICWA and allows the dominant society to judge
whether the parents' cultural background meets its view of what
"Indian culture" should be.68 Doing so puts the state courts right
back into the position they were in before Congress enacted the
ICWA.
69
V. WHY IS IT FLAWED?
The "existing Indian family" exception is in effect swallowing
the rule. 70  It creates a test of application by which many who
qualify under ICWA will not qualify with application of this
exception. It places a focus on families, instead of any potential
relationship between the American Indian child and the tribe.
71
64. In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 83-92; In re Junious M., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 786, 796 (1983); see also Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d
404, 409-16 (1991); In re Suzanna L., 104 Cal. App. 4th 223, 234 (2002).
65. In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 89.
66. Id. at 90.
67. Matter of N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 n.* (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added), cited in In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 90.
68. Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Or. App. 1993), rev'd, 881
P.2d 795, 801 (Or. 1994); In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 999 (Utah App. 1997),
cited in In re Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 90.
69. Quinn, 845 P.2d at 209; In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d at 999, cited in In re
Alicia S., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 90.
70. Charmel L. Cross, Comment, The Existing Indian Family Exception: Is
It Appropriate to Use a Judicially Created Exception to Render the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 Inapplicable?, 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 847, 881 n.206 (1997).
71. Parnell, supra note 2, at 419.
2006]
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A. Ignoring Tribal Interests
Just as a state has an interest in its citizens and residents, tribes
have an interest in their members and potential members. Because
states removed American Indian children from their reservations,
these children did not learn the culture, religion, and language of
their tribes.7 2 Inevitably, if there are no children to pass on the
culture, religion, and language, then a tribe will be extinguished.73
Children are the only real means for the transmission of tribal
heritage.74 If American Indian children are denied exposure to the
ways of their tribes, it seriously undercuts the tribes' ability to
continue as self-governing communities.75
So when an American Indian child is removed from the
surrounding most likely to connect that child with his cultural
heritage, that removal inadvertently continues the gradual genocide
76of American Indians. The ICWA recognized not only that the
child needs the tribe, but also that the tribe needs its children.77
The tribal interest that needs protection is survival. The right
to determine one's members and survive as a tribe lies at the heart
of tribal sovereignty and self-determination.78 Tribes have an
interest in maintaining sovereignty and strengthening tribal
relations.79 Congress knew that an American Indian tribe could
not exist without members80 and further understood that the future
of the tribe lies with its children.81  The federal government's
delayed aspiration to prevent tribal extinction resulted in Congress
72. Sloan Phillips, The Indian Child Welfare Act in the Face of Extinction,
21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 351, 353 (1997).
73. Id.
74. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34, 109
S. Ct. 1597, 1600-01 (1989).
75. Id. at 34, 109 S. Ct. at 1600-01.
76. Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 801 (Or. 1994).
77. Metteer, supra note 39, at 613.
78. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic
Commerce, 51 Emory L.J. 587, 654 (2002).
79. Atwood, supra note 5, at 633.
80. Quinn, 881 P.2d at 802 (Fadeley, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
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identifying tribal survival as a fundamental purpose of the
ICWA.8
2
Tribal sovereignty includes the right to provide for the care and
upbringing of its youngest members.83  This right includes the
recognition of the American Indian concept of family, which is an
extended family model. Under this model, members of an
American Indian child's extended family, such as aunts, uncles,
cousins, or grandparents have child-rearing responsibilities. 84 If a
parent is unable to care for an American Indian child, it is common
in the American Indian community for a relative or friend to step
into the role of parent.
85
The spiritual bonds between an American Indian child and his
family and tribe are acknowledged in American Indian cultural
beliefs, but not understood by those outside the culture.
86
American Indian parents recognize that the child is not theirs alone
but that the child is part of something larger-the tribe. 87 Because
states were unfamiliar with this aspect of American Indian culture
and this country has a long-standing history of depriving American
Indian tribes of their youngest members, Congress enacted the
ICWA.88
The ICWA constitutes a proclamation by Congress to preserve
American Indian tribes through standards which keep American
Indian children within their families and communities whenever
82. Atwood, supra note 5, at 654.
83. Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston,
393 F.Supp. 719, 730 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
84. Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself: The Indian Child Welfare Act
as Inapplicable as Inappropriate to the Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption
Controversy, 38 Brandeis L.J. 47, 49 (1999-2000).
85. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 35, 109
S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1989).
86. Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the
Codification of the Ethnic Best Interests in the Child, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 21, 38
(1997).
87. Robert Coles, M.D. IV, Children of Crisis, Eskimos, Chicanos, Indians
520 (1st ed. 1978); Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 804 (Or. 1994) (Fadeley, J.,
dissenting).
88. Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, Note, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of
Discretion: Eliminating the "Good Cause" Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act
Adoptive Placements, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1167, 1171 (1995).
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possible. 89 Congress intended to provide tribes with more self-
autonomy in child custody proceedings through the ICWA.90 They
recognized that there is no greater threat to "essential tribal
relations" and no greater infringement on tribal self-government
than interference with tribal control over the custody of their
children. 91  For these reasons, Congress established a federal
policy that, when possible, an American Indian child should
remain in the American Indian community.
9 2
The "existing Indian family" exception ignores Congress' goal
of tribal self-determination. It does so by taking the determination
of who is an "Indian child" out of the hands of the tribes, and
placing it in the hands of state courts. These are the same state
courts whose lack of familiarity with tribal customs led to the
enactment of the ICWA.93  Despite the fact that a tribe can
recognize a person as a member, thereby making them American
Indian within the definitions of the ICWA, under the exception, a
state court ultimately determines if the member acts American
Indian enough to appease their perception of what an American
Indian should do or be.
The application of the "existing Indian family" exception also
denies the child the ability to be exposed to her cultural heritage.
94
Congress recognized the importance of the bond between an
American Indian child and the tribe when it enacted the ICWA,
because application of the ICWA is not limited to children who
were current tribe members, but also those eligible for
membership. 95  By recognizing the relationship between an
American Indian child and the tribe, the ICWA presents the tribe
with an opportunity to correct the past.96 However, the exception
denies the tribes the right to establish or renew ties with children
89. Stiffarm, supra note 16, at 1152 (1995).
90. Cross, supra note 70, at 880 n.198.
91. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7537.
92. Id. at 7546.
93. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44-45,
109 S. Ct. 1597, 1606-07 (1989).
94. Parnell, supra note 2, at 432.
95. Id. at 432-33.
96. Id. at 432.
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born to tribal members who are now assimilated into non-
American Indian culture because of past removals.97 It also fails to
answer why a child who has not been exposed to his American
Indian culture should not now be provided the opportunity for
exposure. 98 Keeping American Indian children involved with their
tribe would guarantee the child's cultural identity and maintenance
of American Indian tribes.
99
B. Ignoring the Plain Language
Congress unambiguously defined the key terms of the ICWA:
"Indian child" and "child custody proceeding." The "existing
Indian family" exception, however, ignores the plain language of
the ICWA, especially the definition of "Indian child."' °
1. What is the Plain Language?
Congress defined an "Indian child" as a member of a tribe or as
the biological child of a member and eligible for membership.
0 1
That definition creates a checklist to determine if a child will meet
the definition of an "Indian child." The child is a member of a
tribe: check, the child is an Indian child. Or the child is the
biological child of a member and the child is eligible to be a
member of the tribe: check, check, the child is an Indian child.
With this unambiguous definition Congress identified the
relationship that a parent and child must have with the tribe for the
ICWA to apply: membership.1
0 2
97. Christine Metteer, The Existing Indian Family Exception: An
Impediment to the Trust Responsibility to Preserve Tribal Existence and Culture
as Manifested in the Indian Child Welfare Act, 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 647, 649-
50 (1997).
98. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 Gonz. L. Rev.
353, 381 (1991-1992).
99. Michele K. Bennett, Comment, Native American Children: Caught in
the Web of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 16 Hamline L. Rev. 953, 955 (1993).
100. Parnell, supra note 2, at 408.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2005).
102. Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (Edmonds, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 881 P.2d 795 (Or. 1994).
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The "existing Indian family" exception adds requirements to
this definition of "Indian child." It is insufficient under the
exception to be a member of a tribe. Depending upon which court
is applying the exception, the additional requirements range from
living in an "Indian home," to living in an "Indian family,"'10 3 to
either the child or the parent being Indian enough in the eyes of the
court.1°4 To be Indian enough, the child or the parent must
convince the court that he has a significant relationship with Indian
tribal culture. 105 All of these requirements are beyond the reach of
the definition of "Indian child," because "[n]o amount of probing
into what Congress 'intended' can alter what Congress said, in
plain English, at 25 U.S.C. §1903(4). 106
2. Statutory Interpretation and Construction
In order for a court to apply the "existing Indian family"
exception it must ignore the clear provisions of the ICWA and rely
on what the court believes Congress meant to say.107 In the only
U.S. Supreme Court case involving the ICWA, the Court held that
it was improbable that Congress would have left the ICWA's key
jurisdictional provision-domicile-subject to definition by state
courts as a matter of 'state law. °8 The Court recognized that
Congress did not intend to leave this key term to be defined by the
very state courts whose past misunderstanding and prejudice
against American Indian traditions was one of the reasons that the
ICWA was enacted. 0 9 Accordingly, it seems implausible that
Congress intended for these same state courts to determine when
an American Indian parent or child was sufficiently connected to
American Indian culture to trigger application of the ICWA." 0
Another explanation for the Court's decision is the rule of
103. Parnell, supra note 2, at 413.
104. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996).
105. Id. at 1511.
106. Matter of N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 n.* (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J.,
concurring).
107. Metteer, supra note 97, at 660 n.39.
108. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45, 109
S. Ct. 1597, 1607 (1989).
109. Cross, supra note 70, at 873.
110. Id.
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construction that federal statutes are generally intended to have
uniform nationwide application. 1'
The principle "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" means
that the expression of one thing excludes others." 2 The ICWA
provides for two exceptions to its application: divorce proceedings
and juvenile delinquency proceedings. So under this general rule
of statutory construction, these express exceptions serve to exclude
any other exceptions, including the "existing Indian family"
exception." 3  As a general principle, when Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions, additional exceptions are not to be
implied. 14  The "existing Indian family" exception is an
impermissibly implied exception.
C. Perpetuating a Stereotype of American Indians
1. What is the Stereotype?
The trouble with the "existing Indian family" exception is that
it asks what it means to be an "Indian child" and an Indian family,
but uses white "civilized society's" definitions to answer these
questions. 115  When applying the "existing Indian family"
exception, these courts rely on their preconceived notions of what
an American Indian is or should be. In one example, a court
expected the American Indian family to "adopt [American Indian]
culture as a day to day way of life."" 6  This expectation
demonstrates the court's unawareness of American Indian cultures.
There is no one American Indian culture to which a person can
111. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 43-44, 109 S. Ct.
at 1605-06; Jerome v. U.S., 318 U.S. 101, 104, 63 S. Ct. 483, 485-86 (1943);
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119-20, 103 S. Ct. 986,
994-95 (1983); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402-03, 61 S. Ct. 659,
660-61 (1941).
112. Ronald Benton Brown & Sharon Jacobs Brown, Statutory
Interpretation: The Search for Legislative Intent § 5.4.1, at 81 (NITA 2002).
113. Parnell, supra note 2, at 408-09, n.160.
114. Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S. Ct. 1910
(1980).
115. Metteer, supra note 39, at 611.
116. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996).
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subscribe. There are more than 569 federally recognized tribes" 7
and thus more than 569 different American Indian cultures.
2. What is Wrong with the Stereotype?
Prior to the ICWA, social workers and state officials found that
many Indian parents were socially irresponsible and possessed
inadequate child-rearing capabilities because they used extended
family members to assist in caring for the child. 118 However, it
was common in many American Indian families to rely upon a
network of family members as responsible caregivers. 119 The
conclusions of the social workers and state officials were received
with disbelief by American Indian tribes whose cultural
perceptions of child-rearing often are fundamentally different from
non-Indian standards. 1
20
Congress found the states so deficient in concrete knowledge
of traditional American Indian customs and traditions that it
enacted the ICWA. 12 1 Nowhere in the ICWA are there limits
regarding where the "Indian child" must live or what type of
cultural activities the "Indian child" must practice. 122  Courts
which apply the "existing Indian family" exception have the
judicial gumption to assume responsibility for ferreting out the
"real" from the "counterfeit" American Indians, considering
Congress placed this determination with the tribes themselves.
These courts identify fake American Indians as those who have
become fully assimilated into non-American Indian culture.
24
These courts do so by finding that "token attestations of
cultural identity" are inadequate to establish the judicially required,
significant cultural traditions and affiliations. These courts
117. Rural Assistance Center, Tribal Health Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.raconline.org/info-guides/tribal/tribalhealthfaq.php#howmany (last
visited October 10, 2005).
118. Stiffarm, supra note 16, at 1154.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Jones, supra note 3, at 416-17.
122. Parnell, supra note 2, at 427.
123. Jones, supra note 3, at 415.
124. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1507 (1996).
125. Id. at 1512.
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require significant cultural traditions and affiliations, because they
believe that the ICWA is intended only to preserve American
Indian culture, not foster it.126 Therefore, by the "existing Indian
family" exception courts have, in effect, created a litmus test for
"Indian-ness."
Their "Indian-ness" litmus test includes such things as ties to
the tribe, Indian cultural setting, and length of time living in an
Indian home. 127 One court has gone so far as to require that the
child live in an "actual Indian dwelling.'' 128 Another court has
been gracious enough to provide a laundry list so that the real
Indians can be identified. To be "Indian" for this court, either the
child or the parent must: privately identify themselves as Indians
and privately observe tribal customs; participate in tribal
community affairs, vote in tribal elections, or otherwise take an
interest in tribal politics; contribute to tribal or Indian charities,
subscribe to tribal newsletters or other periodicals of special
interest to Indians; participate in Indian religious, social, cultural,
or political events which are held in their own locality; or maintain
social contacts with other members of the tribe.
129
This litmus test of "Indian-ness" ignores the clear definitions in
the ICWA. To be an Indian, all that is required is tribal
membership, not a showing that you comply with some non-
American Indian judges' concept of what an American Indian is or
should be. In making these determinations, these state court judges
are making the very value judgments Congress did not feel it was
able to make.130 These state courts are, once again, demonstrating
that they lack the capacity and understanding to have
determination power over American Indians.
126. Id.
127. Davis, supra note 46, at 489.
128. Metteer, supra note 39, at 612.
129. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1514-15.
130. Westphal, supra note 42, at 139.
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D. It is Not Needed to Prevent the ICWA from Being
Unconstitutional
An in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues is beyond the
scope of this article. 131  However, a mere glance at the
constitutional issues reveals that the ICWA is constitutional. First,
American Indian tribes are not subject to the U.S. Constitution. 132
American Indian tribes are sovereigns with their own constitutions,
whereas the U.S. Constitution specifically limits federal and state
power.133 The courts using the "existing Indian family" exception
to keep the ICWA from being unconstitutional argue that it
violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 34  The Supreme Court,
however, determined that a tribe's interests are superior to those of
the individual tribe member because protection of the tribe's
interest is intended to benefit the class in which he is a member.
35
This would make an analysis focused on individual rights contrary
to the provisions of the ICWA.'
3 6
1. Congressional Power over American Indians
a. In General
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution (the
Indian Commerce clause) reserves to Congress the power to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes.' 37  This clause grants
Congress plenary power over American Indians, thus allowing
Congress to legislate regarding American Indians as long as that
131. See Metteer, supra note 84, at 49; John Robert Renner, The Indian Child
Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal Power Over
Indian Affairs, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 129 (1992) (in-depth analysis of the
constitutional law issues).
132. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1675
(1978).
133. Metteer, supra note 97, at 668.
134. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1501 (1996).
135. Metteer, supra note 84, at 57.
136. Carleton, supra note 86, at 37.
137. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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legislation is not arbitrary. 138 The Supreme Court, in interpreting
treaties and legislation dealing with American Indians, articulated
that such legislation must be considered in light of "the broad
policies that underlie them" and traditional notions of tribal
sovereignty. 139 In Morton v. Mancari, the Court stated, "[A]s long
as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgment will not be disturbed."1 40
b. The ICWA
During discussion of the ICWA, Congress was aware of these
constitutional issues. The Department of Justice report of February
9 and May 23, 1978 raised questions regarding the constitutionality
of certain provisions of the legislation. 14  Therefore, when
Congress enacted the ICWA, it cited the Indian Commerce clause
and "other constitutional authority" as the bases for its authority to
pass such legislation. 142 Congress found that it has a responsibility
to protect and preserve American Indian tribes and their
resources. 14 3  Congress further established "that there is no
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity
of Indian tribes than their children."' 144
2. The ICWA does not Violate the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment requires due process when the federal
government attempts to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
138. Parnell, supra note 2, at 435-36.
139. Lehmann, supra note 7, at 538 (citing Ramah Navajo School Bd. v.
Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 838, 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398-99 (1982)).
140. Stan Watts, Note, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978: Balancing the Interests of Children, Families and Tribes, 63 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 213, 228 (1989) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 536, 94 S. Ct.
2474, 2476 (1974)).
141. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7534.
142. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (2005).
143. Id. § 1901(2).
144. Id. § 1901(3).
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property. 4 5 Since the ICWA is not dealing with a fundamental
right, the test should be whether the legislation is rationally related
to a legitimate government interest.146 The courts which apply the
"existing Indian family" exception subject the legislation to the
higher standard of strict scrutiny. 147 However, applying the strict
scrutiny test for legislation regarding American Indians and
American Indian tribes is contrary to the reasonably related
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morton.148 When
interpreting legislation related to American Indians, the Court
determined the proper test is whether the legislation was rationally
related to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to
American Indians. 149 If rational, then the Court would not overrule
Congress' judgment.150
3. The ICWA does not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that states not deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process or equal
protections under the law. 5 1 Under the "existing Indian family"
exception courts argue that the ICWA uses a racial classification
and, as such, it requires strict scrutiny. 152 However, the Court has
stated that when legislation is directed toward American Indians, it
is not a racial classification if it is limited to members of federally
recognized tribes. 153 The Court determined that such classification
is a political one.
154
Since the ICWA contains no blood quantum requirement to
determine whether a particular person is an American Indian, it is
145. U.S. Const. amend. V.
146. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law
371 (2d ed. 2005).
147. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1487 (1996).
148. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 2484 (1974).
149. Parnell, supra note 2, at 430.
150. Id. at430-31.
151. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
152. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1501.
153. Morton, 417 U.S. at 554 n.24, 94 S. Ct. at 2484 n.24.
154. Id.
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not a racial classification. 155 Each of the 562 federally recognized
tribes determines its own eligibility criteria, which ranges from a
minimum blood quantum requirement to a no minimum blood
quantum requirement. 156 Since the ICWA is based upon a political
classification, the determination of whether it violates equal
protection is dependent on the tribe's historical political
relationship with the federal government, instead of the child's
"social, cultural or political" relationship with the tribe.'57 Tribe
members have the ability to renounce tribal affiliation, which
distinguishes "American Indian" from any racial classifications,
since no other race member can voluntarily relinquish her racial
status. 158  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has,
without fail, upheld all federal legislation regarding American
Indians as not violating equal protection requirements.159  The
ICWA is constitutional without applying the invented "existing
Indian family" exception.
E. The ICWA Lacks Uniformity
The perception of what constitutes an "Indian family" has
differed from court to court.' 60 The application of the "existing
Indian family" exception is thus unpredictable and results in
inconsistent outcomes.' 61  One never knows when a court will
apply it or ignore it.162  The "existing Indian family" exception
may be applied in situations where the American Indian child
155. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act
Myths and Mistaken Application, 83 Mich. B.J. 19, 21 (2004).
156. Id.
157. Metteer, supra note 97, at 682.
158. Metteer, supra note 84, at 56.
159. Id. at 55.
160. In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1490 (1996).
161. Cross, supra note 70, at 891.
162. In California alone, the application of the "existing Indian family"
exception to avoid application of the ICWA is unpredictable and inconsistent.
The following have applied the exceptions: In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999); In Re Alexandria Y., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); In re
Wanomi, 264 Cal. Rptr. 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). For cases that have refused to
apply the exception, see cases cited supra note 64. Also, compare supra section
IV(l) with IV(2).
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never lived in an American Indian family and had no association
with American Indian culture, even though his biological parent
had such associations.
63
The Supreme Court recognized that with the passage of the
ICWA, Congress intended nationwide uniformity. 164  In
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court
determined that a uniform definition of domicile was necessary to
achieve the purpose of the ICWA. 165  Similarly, a uniform
definition of American Indian child is also necessary to accomplish
the ICWA's purpose. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in eight cases involving the "existing
Indian family" doctrine, including one from Division Three of the
Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal.
166
VI. CALIFORNIA'S RESPONSE AS A MODEL FOR CONGRESS
A. Senate Bill 678
California State Senator Denise Moreno Ducheny introduced
Senate Bill 678 (SB 678) in February 2005. This bill represents an
important means to protect the interests of American Indian
children, families, and tribes by comprehensively amending state
law to ensure compliance by state courts and county agencies with
the ICWA. 167 The Senate Bill mandates that the ICWA applies
regardless whether the American Indian child was in the physical
custody of an American Indian parent at the commencement of a
custody proceeding, parental rights have been terminated, or the
child has lived on an American Indian reservation. 68 It further
mandates that a tribe's determination of the child's membership
status is conclusive. In the absence of a tribal determination, the
163. Walters, supra note 48, at 639.
164. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45, 109
S. Ct. 1597, 1607 (1989).
165. Id.
166. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In re Santos Y., 92 Cal.
App. 4th 1274, 1305 (2001).
167. California Indian Legal Services, Summary of SB 678,
http://www.calindian.org/tribal alert03.01.05.attach2.doc (last visited March 26,
2006).
168. Id.
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Bureau of Indian Affairs' determination that a child is an Indian
child is conclusive.
169
The Senate Bill also adds to the California Probate Code the
same provision which was added to the California Family Code
170
and the Welfare and Institutions Code' 7 1 by Assembly Bill 65 in
1999. This provision affirms California's interest in protecting
169. Id.
170. Cal. Fam. Code § 7810. Indian child custody proceedings; legislative
findings and declarations.
(a) The Legislature finds and declares the following:
(1) There is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of recognized Indian tribes than their children, and the State of
California has an interest in protecting Indian children who are members
of, or are eligible for membership in, an Indian tribe.
(2) It is in the interest of an Indian child that the child's membership in the
child's Indian tribe and connection to the tribal community be encouraged
and protected.
(b) In all Indian child custody proceedings, as defined in the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.§ 1901 et seq.), the court shall consider all of
the findings contained in subdivision (a), strive to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families, comply with the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act, and seek to protect the best interest of the child.
(c) A determination by an Indian tribe that an unmarried person, who is
under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2)
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe shall constitute a significant political affiliation
with the tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to the proceedings.
171. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 360.6. Indian child custody proceedings;
legislative findings and declarations.
(a) The Legislature finds and declares the following:
(1) There is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children, and the State of California has
an interest in protecting Indian children who are members of, or are eligible
for membership in, an Indian tribe.
(2) It is in the interest of an Indian child that the child's membership in the
child's Indian tribe and connection to the tribal community be encouraged
and protected.
(b) In all Indian child custody proceedings, as defined in the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), the court shall consider all
of the findings contained in subdivision (a), strive to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families, comply with the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act, and seek to protect the best interest of the child.
(c) A determination by an Indian tribe that an unmarried person, who is
under the age of 18 years, is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2)
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe shall constitute a significant political affiliation
with the tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act to the proceedings.
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American Indian children and the American Indian child's interest
in having tribal membership and a connection to the tribal
community. 172
The California State Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a
hearing and voted on SB 678.17 SB 678 then went to the Senate
Appropriations Committee for a hearing on August 25, 2005.174
On that date, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to place
SB 678 on its suspense file. 75 This caused SB 678 to become a
two-year bill that still needs to work its way through the California
Assembly. 176 The Senate passed SB 678 on January 30, 2006.177
B. Congressional Amendment to the ICWA
California Senate Bill 678 will only prevent the use of the
"existing Indian family" exception in California. In order to
achieve national uniformity, Congress must amend the ICWA so
that it specifically excludes the use of the "existing Indian family"
exception.
Currently, "Indian child" means any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 178 Congress could
add a third subsection to 25 U.S.C. §1903(4) which reads: an
"Indian child" who meets the definition determined under (a) and
(b) is an "Indian child" for purposes of the ICWA regardless of the
existence of an Indian family. Because state courts are acting
beyond the scope of the ICWA, Congress needs to respond with an
amendment to the ICWA.
172. California Indian Legal Services, Summary of SB 678,
http://www.calindian.org/tribal alert03.01.05.attach2.doc (last visited March 26,
2006).
173. California Indian Legal Services, Tribal Alert: Senate Judiciary
Hearing Committee on SB 678 (RE ICWA) Rescheduled for August 23, 2005,
http://www.calindian.org/tribalalert07.06.05.htm (last visited March 26, 2006).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. California Indian Legal Services, SB 678 Passes Senate,
http://www.calindian.org/news-01.31.06.htm (last visited March 26, 2006).
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2005).
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CONCLUSION
Once again, Congress must strip state courts of its usurped
authority over the determination of American Indian children. The
"existing Indian family" exception ignores tribal interests in
maintaining connections with its only means of survival: its
children. The exception violates not only the plain language of the
ICWA, but also the spirit by perpetuating a stereotype of American
Indians. Although state courts use constitutional issues as a guise
for implementing the "existing Indian family" exception, the
exception itself violates the Constitution with state courts exerting
authority over American Indians reserved to Congress. Finally, the
lack of uniformity caused by the use of the exception obligates
Congress to act. Amending the ICWA is a simple, but effective
remedy to the state courts' offensive use of the "existing Indian
family" exception.

